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Abstract
India spends 6 percent of its GDP on health-three times classification of disease and are medically expected to
the amount spent by Indonesia and twice that last less than two weeks. The authors show that short
of China-and spending on non-chronic morbidities is duration morbidities are important in terms of
three times that of chroniic illnesses. It is normally prevalence, practitioner visits, and household health
assumed that the high spending on non-chronic illnesses expenditure: Individuals report a short duration
reflects the prevalence of morbidities with high morbidity in one out of every five weeks. Moreover, one
case-fatality or case-disability ratios. But there is little out of every three weeks reported with a short duration
data that can be used to separate out spending by type of morbidity results in a doctor visit, and each week sick
illness. Das and Sanchez-Paranio address this issue with a with such a morbidity increases health expenditure by 25
unique dataset where 1,621 individuals in Delhi were percent. Further, the absolute spending on short duration
observed for 16 weeks through detailed weekly morhidities is similar across poor and rich income
interviews on morbidity and health-seeking behavior. households. The authors discuss the implications of these
The authors' findings are surprising and contrary to findings In understanding household health behavior in
the normal view of health spending. They define a new an urban context, with special emphasis on the role of
class of illnesses as "short duration morbidities" if they information in health-seeking behavior.
are classified as non-chronic in the international
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1 Introduction
India spends 6 per cent of its GDP on health, three times the amount spent by Indonesia or
Philippines and twice the amount spent by China (World Bank, 1993). Based on existing ,urveys'
, 60 per cent of this expenditure is on primary care, otit of which households contriblute more than
80 per cent. Moreover, spending on non-chronic morbidity is three times that on chronic illnesses
(Shariff, 1999).
It is normally assumed that the large proportion of expenditure devoted to non-chronic illnesses
reflects the prevalence of morbidities with high case-fatality ratios (e.g. tuberculosis) or with high
probability of leading to permanent disability (e.g. leprosy). However, existing data does not
allow us to discern the pattern of spending, either by categories of chronicity, or by categories of
severity. As a result, morbidities that do not exhibit high case-fatality or case-disability ratios
have not received much attention in the literature2 . This may not be a matter for concern if
such illnesses have little impact on the overall disease burden or on health expenditure. However, if
individual behavior is based on self rather than clinical assessment of the severity of the illness, such
morbidities could account for a large proportion of doctor visits and health expenditure. Limited
survey data arising frorn small scale studies suggest that this is actually the case (Phadke, 1992;
Kumar, 1993).
In this paper we use unique data collected for 1,621 individuals in Delhi to provide a more
detailed description of the patterns of morbidity and health seeking in the hidian urban context.
The focus of our exposition will be on a special class of illnesses, referred to as 'Short Duration
Morbidities', that satisfy two criteria. First, they are classified as non-chroniic in the International
Classification of Disease. Second, since this group still includes diseases like tuberculosis, through
consultations with doctors3 wve select only those illnesses that are medically expected to last less
than two weeks (e.g. 'viral fever' or 'minor allergies'). It is important to note that our construction
of a short duration morbidity is based on the report of the individual and not the actual underlying
sickness. Thus such a morbidity is likely to be an illness that the individual (and the practitioners
treating the individual) believe to be non-chronic and of short duration. While the distinction
between the underlyiing morbidity and the actual report is an importanit one, for now our reference
l National Sample Survey (1973-74), (Sarvekshana,1980), and an all-bidia survey conduicted by the National
Council of Applied Economic Rcsearch, NCAER (Sharriff, 1999).
2 For example, it has been argued that the high frequency of self-reported symptoms in Indonesia indicates " many
minor healtlh probleins that do not need expensive medical care or affect labor supply" (Gertler and Gruber, 1999).
3 S. Das, Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General Hospital; A. l'aneja, Holy Family Hospital (Delhi);
K. Taneja, Holy Family Hospital (Delhi).
to a 'short duration morbidity' should be interpreted as the report of a short duration morbidity,
and we return to the distinction between these two in Section 6 below.
We find that a large proportion of reported illnesses in our sample correspond to Short Duration
Morbidities, and moreover such reported imorbidities account for a significant share of practitioner
visits and health expenditure. In particular, 95 per cent of all non-chronic episodes and 90 per
cent of all episodes reported during the sample period are Short Duration Morbidities, and these
episodes account for 80 per cent of all practitioner visits and 57 per cent of private health
expenditure.
Moreover poor individuals visit a practitioner more often and spend a larger share of their
income on Short Duration Morbidities than the rich. This is specially surprising once we recognize
that if health is a normal good and agents have access to the same information set, the gradient
between health expenditure (as well as quality of health care sought) and income should increase
with a decrease in the severity of the illness (on this, see Section 6 below). Our results on the
frequency of visits and health expenditure by the poor hence argues for a more nuanced view of the
health environment in Low Income Countries, where poor health outcomes are usually tnderstood
to be a consequence of both the lack of access to health practitioners and the lack of economic
resources on the part of individuals.
The second part of our study then examines the incidence of Short Duration Morbidities (SDMs
henceforth) using the longitudinal nature of our survey. Our interest in this section is to disaggregate
further the impact of short duration morbidities on households- is it the case that there is a class
of individuals/households that are particularly susceptible to such illnesses? Alternatively, is it the
case that the bulk of doctor visits and expenditure are driven by a particular kind of morbidity or
set of individual/hotusehold attributes?
Our findings show that SDMs tend to cluster at the level of the individual; that is, some
individuals experience a large number of SDMs, while others report just one or Ino episodes at all.
Furthermore, while a significant part of this clustering can be explained by individual demographic
characteristics, the commumity that the individual lives in plays an equally important role. While
we do not offer an explanation at this stage of why this may be so, we hypothesize that community
characteristics may be a proxy for the quality of the existing medical system.
This paper is the first step in a project on morbidity and health seeking behavior in India. As
such, it has two objectives. Our first goal is to provide a detailed description of the morbidity
profile of the area (with special emphasis on SDMs), and to present a thorough investigation of
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the health environment we are dealing with. In doing so we discover a set of novel elements that
lead us to rethink several (economic) issues related to health. Our second objective is to lay out
a broad research agenda motivated by this findings. For this purpose, at the end of the paper
we speculate on the way in which our results could potentially affect our understanding of the
relationship between key economic and health variables, such as health seeking and labor market
behavior.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide an introduction
to the institutional set up and the data. Section 4 establishes the importance of SDMs in our
sample using three related measures: prevalence of, practitioner visits induced by, and expenditure
associated with such morbidities. In Section 5, we show that SDMs tend to cluster at the individual
level, even after controlling for observables, and that this phenomenon is directly correlated with
expenditure clusters. Section 6 discusses the implications of the findings presented in the paper for
the standard model of health seeking-behavior with well-informed, utility-maximizing individuals
and Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Setup
Medical care in India is provided by both the public and the private sector. Government provision
of health is based on a territorial model, with the urban sector catered to through the use of
Government dispensaries (at the first tier) and hospitals. A consistent problem with government
health services has been the lack of monitoring and proper incentives in the sector, resulting in
crowed and poorly staffed facilities and tremeildous variation in the quality of services provided
(Kamat, 1995). As a result households overwhelmingly use private sources of health care. Doctor
visits in our saniple show a similar pattern, with the private sector accounting for more than 70%
of all visits.
Such ample use of the private sector, together with the lack of health insurance (less than 1 per
cent of the population is insured), irnplies that 75 per cent of all health expenditures are met from
out-of-pocket sources, with 46 per cent of this expenditure incurred on primary outpatient care.
This amount accounts for a high fraction of total household expenditure, varying from 2.9 per cent
(Gujarat) to 7.2 per cent (Uttar Pradesh). Across expenditure quintiles, the proportion of income
spent on health care increases sharply for the lower quintiles, as does the fraction of expenditure
oIn primary as opposed to hospital care (Bermran, 1998; World Bank, 1997).
Combined with the low use of government resources is the lack of de facto regulation of phar-
macies and practitioners. Poor pharmaceutical regulation implies that it is possible to buy most
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medications over-the-counter (Kamat and Nichter, 1998; Saradamma et al., 2000). Similarly, the
lack of regulation of practitioners has led to a proliferation of care-givers with varying qualifica-
tions. Statistics based on the formal sector report only 0.7 doctors/1000 population (this includes
public and private sector doctors), but once the informal sector4 is accounted for, this increases to
between 2.5/1000 and 4/1000, a level comparable to that of Germany arid the US. The high density
of pharmacies and practitioners is evident in the patterns of self-medication and the structure of
the health market for our sample. For every household in our sample, there are at least 80 doctors
and 5 pharmacies within a 15 minute walking distance, thus affording easy access to both health
care providers and medicines.
3 Data
3.1 Methodology and Summary Statistics
Our study uses a 16 week panel of 1,621 individuals living in seven different localities in Delhi (In-
dia). Five of these localities were initially chosen through informal contacts, while the remaining
two were chosen using a health questionnaire administered in 6 schools of Delhi. In this question-
naire households were asked, among other questions, if they would like to participate in a longer
survey. Households which answered positively then served as an entry into these two communities5
In all seven localities households were chosen randomly. In particular, in each neighborhood
a street was chosen at random, and every fourth household located on that street was asked to
participate in the survey. Refusal rates were less than 4 per cent in all localities.
The survey methodology incorporates two innovations. First, the recall period for the survey was
shortened from one month (as in the LSMS) to one week, enabling us to collect extremely accurate
information on doctor visits, expenditure and medication. Hence, during the four month survey
period, each household was samipled weekly (i.e. the interviewer visited each household on the
same day each week) to collect quantitative as well as narrative information. Second, information
was collected separately on chronic and non-chronic conditions. Chronic conditions were identified
through initial interviews, and these were individually followed each week (for instance, someone
reporting diabetes would be asked about the diabetes each week). Apart from chronic conditions, a
general question ("Were you sick last week") was used to screen for other illnesses, and conditional
on a positive response, questions were asked about the morbidity and resulting actions.
' The informal sector includes all medical practitioners who are not registered with any certifying authority
(Non-Registered Medical Practitioners).
S B, Kheda, J. Puri, Noida, S. Vihar and K. Nagar were chosen through research contacts. P. Nagar and South
Delhi were chosen through the administration of a general health questionnaire in different schools in Delhi.
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In each week, the information from the previous week was summarized in a 'feedback form',
and this was used by surveyors to follow up and link morbidities across weeks in the survey period.
In addition to the weekly questionnaires, basic demographic, facility and expenditure data was also
collected for all households 6 .
Given the structure of the data on morbidity in the sample, and since some illness episodes may
last for more than a week, we use two different morbidity measures throughout the paper: sick-
weeks and full episodes. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical set of responses obtained
over a three week period:
Week Were you sick? What illness did you have?
1 yes stoinachache
2 yes headache
3 yes headache
The information reported by this individual will be coded in two different ways. First we will
record two full episodes, based on the observation that the individual reports one illness in week 1,
and a different illness in weeks 2 and 3. Second we will also record three sick-weeks, corresponding
to the number of weeks that the individual reports an illness episode. The main rationale for
simultaneously using these two measures is that the latter is more efficient when dealing with
within-episode dynamics (e.g. timing of doctor visits), while the former provides a better measure
of the severity of the illness (e.g. in terms of duration and expenditure associated with the episode).
Following this definition, Table 2 shows that there were 3,324 full episodes (5,630 sick weeks) during
the period of the survey with an average duration of 7.59 days 7 .
3.2 Sample Characteristics
Summary statistics for all individuals (households) in the sample are presented in Table L.A (Table
11.B). Individuals in our sample tend to be young (with a median age of 22), poorly educated (50 per
cent of all individuals are either illiterate or have less than primary education) and live in nuclear
households with an average of 5.4 members per household. Regarding the labor force status of the
individuals in the sample, about 50 per cent of those above 15 are employed, resulting in 1.5 income
6 The data was collected dulring the months of August-December of 2000 in the first four localities (wave 1), and
during the months of January-April, 2001 in the last three localities (wave .2). While there is no period duirinlg the
year when morbidity is expected to be higher than average, the nature of the morbidity profile does exhibit some
seasonality. For instance, the monsoons occur during the summer months, increasing the risk of gastroenteritis,
cholera, and malaria, while rain is scarce in the winter months, leading to numerous respiratory problems associated
with high pollution levels.
7 Information on episode duration is missing for 221 SDM episodes out of total of 3,545 (6 per cent). Ninety per
cent of these episodes were recorded for a maximum of 1-2 weeks.
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earners per household, although only a third of them are in the formal sector (public and private)8
Table L.A also presents summary statistics by income groups9 . Per capita income among rich
households (using the square root of the number of household ierribers as a deflator to account
for potential scale economies) is more than three times that among poor households (Table 1.B).
Since both household size and the number of employed adults per household are similar across
incomie groups, this variation in income levels is rmainly due to differences in the earning capacity
of employed adults. As expected, average age and education are higher for the rich, who also
enjoy better access to infrastructure facilities and sanitation systems such as flush toilets and piped
water. Employment rates are not substantially different across income groups, but the composition
of employment does vary with a higher incidence of public sector employment among the middle
and upper income groups.
Anticipating the results of the paper, one of the issues that we will be concerned about is
whether the sample that we have drawn is particularly biased towards high morbidity and/or health
expenditures, compared to a representative sample of Delhi. Appendix I explores this issue is some
detail through comparisons of our sample with that of the (Delhi) National Family Health (1993)
and National Sample Survey (2000). The differences that emerge point towards a slightly younger
population (with a one year difference in the mean age) and a greater density of households in the
upper income groups for our sample. As the Appendix indicates, these differences do not appear to
be large, and (assuming a positive relationship between income and health), should actually bias
our results towards less morbidity than what is representative for Delhi as a whole.
4 How Important are Short Duration Morbidities?
4.1 Prevalence, Doctor Visits and Expenditures
One out of every five observations in the sample corresponds to a SDM report, with more than 75
per cent of all individuals and 95 per cent of households experiencing at least one SDM episode
8 The skewness of the age distribution towards younger groups (35 per cent of all individuiaLs are helow 15) implies
that a large fraction of the sample has never been married (5( per cent) and that there are a substantial number of
individuals of school-going age in the sample. For this reason we report the individual's actual education level for
those above the age of 15, and the individual's mother's educationi level for those ages 0 to 15.
9 Followilg Filmer and Pritchett (???) household per capita income was contructed using information on the
household assets to correct for problems associated with measurement error in reported income/consumption, the
presence of outliers and differences in tastes across houselholds. In particular log per capita consumption expenditure
(corrected to account for economies of scale in consumption at the household level) was regressed on a number of
assets and indicator variables for access to different types of infrstructure and facilities. The coefficients from this
regression were then used to predict consuimption expendituire for each household. This measure correlates strongly
with reported household income, while mitigating the problems mentioned above.
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during the 16 weeks of the survey. This translates into every household having one sick member
every week or alternatively, that 20 per cent of all weeks are spent sick with an short duration
morbidity among the individuals in our sample. The bulk of SDM episodes are either respira-
tory (colds/coughs/allergies), musculo-skeletal (sprains/strains/minor injuries) or gastrointestinal
(acidity or diarrhea) and last just over 7 days on average (Table 2). Moreover the report of a short
duration morbidity is negatively correlated with income - 18 per cent of all weekly reports by the
rich correspond to a SDM compared to 22 per cent for the poor, and 71 per cernt of rich individuals
report having been ever sick with a SDM compared to 82 per cent for the poor.
In itself, these results may not be surprising- given the short recall period and the frequency of
visits, it is entirely likely that a number of 'minor' morbidities (such as a headache from work) are
reported and these reports are uncorrelated to subsequent actions. However, a surprising finding
is that the reports of such morbidities have real consequences, both in terms of doctor visits and
health expenditure.
We find that individuals in the lowest income group make 0.12 weekly practitioner visits for
SDM reports'o (i.e., one member of a household visits a doctor with a SDM every fortnight), while
these numbers are 0.08 and 0.06 respectively for those in the middle and highest income groups
(Table 3). Although poor people may be sick more often and thus visit the doctor more, when
we condition on the occurrence of an SDM episode (contact rate), we find that the poor still visit
a practitioner more often per sick-week than the rich" . In particular, 1 out of every 2.5 SDM
weekly reports corresponds to a practitioner visit for the poor, while this number drops to only
1 out of every 3.3 for the rich. Similarly, the poor visit a practitioner in 1 out of every 2 SDM
(full) episodes, while the rich do so in 1 out of every 2.7. The inverse relationship between income
and health service use that we observe in the sample is further characterized by the following three
observations:
1. This relationship is not a characteristic of the (observable) epidemiological profile across
income groups. The relationship continues to hold even after we condition on type of illness
(e.g. fever or respiratory conditions), duration of illness (e.g. illness that last less than 7
days) and interactions between the type and duration of illness (e.g. fevers that last less than
7 days).
2. Interestingly though, the higher number of visits by the poor does not correspond to greater
use of overall health resources by the poor: recall froim our previous discussion that due to the
10 Where the term practitioner refers to government facilities, trained biomedical doctors, homeopaths, indigenous
practioners, and untrained practitioners, but not pharmacies.
The difference is significant for a 99% confidence interval.
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lack of pharmaceutical regulation, almost all medicines can be purchased over-the-counter,
and as a consequence the pharmacy miay be used as a substitute for a practitioner visit12
Graph 2 shows that the incidence of self-medication is high and varies considerably across
income groups with the rich self-medicating for SDM episodes (50 per cent of the time) far
more than the poor (30 per cent).
3. A third possibility is that this relationship arises due to differences in the use of public/private
providers across income groups. Given the density of public providers and the very low cost,
it could be that these visits are largely accounted for by the public sector, and thus have
no associated expenditures for the poor. Although the poor do use public health resources
more than the rich, higher contacts rates for the poor cannot be explained by high use of
these resources. In fact approximately 70 per cent of the visits mnade by this group are to the
private sector, with more than 45 per cent to private doctors in the formal sector alone. The
high number of visits to the private sector impact directly on expenditure, as detailed below.
Expenditure on SDMs represents a high share of overall spending and tends to be regressive
in nature. Individuals in the sample spend an average of Rs.25.5 on SDMs each month, which
accounts for 46 per cent of total rrontlhly expenditure on health (Table 4.A). This translates into
an alnual per capita expenditure on SDMs of Rs.306. The bulk of expenditure is accounted for by
medication (65 per cent)13 , followed by consultation fees and diagnostic tests (20 and 4 per cent,
respectively). Itansportation costs are almost niegligible (2 per cent) witlh most people visiting
practitioners located near their homes.
When we examine differences in expendittire on SDMs hy income groups, it becomes apparent
that the poor spend relatively more than the rich on these episodes. In particular, poor individuals
spend an average of RIs.24.5 per month on SDMs, or 75 per cent of their monthly health expenses,
compared to Rs.26.0 (37 per cent) for the middle income group and Rs.27.1 (40 per cent) for the
rich. In this respect it is important to notice that high expenditure oII SDMs by the poor is not
driven by abnormally high expenditiures on the part of a few individuals compared to other income
groups: Graph 2 shows that the distribution of expenditure on SDMs is fairly similar across the
three income groups.
12 Medication (and advice) obtained in this malner is recorded in oiur data as 'self-medication'. Self-medication
refers to both genuine self-medication (85 per cent of all self-medication events) and chemist prescription ('chemist
as doctor', 15 per ceiit). Genuine self-medication mainly results from the use of an old prescription (37 per cent),
prior knowledlge (combined with a positive experience) of the medicine (31 per cent) or advice hy a family nmemnber
(20 per cent).
13 Because a large fraction of practioners also dlispense me(licines (60 per cent), the cost of these may sometimes
reflect consultation fees as well.
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If we examine instead SDM expenditure at the household level, the numbers are equally striking.
Poor households spend on average roughly the same amount on SDMs as rich households (Rs.130-
140/month), while they report much lower health and overall expenditure levels than the rich.
This implies that poor families are spending a significantly larger fraction of their health and
overall budgets on SDMs than rich ones. Specifically expenditure on SDMs represents 70 per cent
of total health expenditure and 3.3 per cent of total expenditure in poor households, whereas these
numbers are 40 and 1 per cent respectively in rich households. The results oii SDM expenditure
are particularly stark when compared to other human capital investments: the median monthly
expenditure on SDMs represents 85 per cent of the median outlay oII education for the average
household in the sample, while this number is 200 per cent and 10 per cent for the poor and rich
households respectively- a striking difference.
Further, the expenditure on short duration morbidities arises due to the high spending on a
number of exceptionally severe episodes combined with the frequent occurrence of small outlays on
such morbidities throughout the survey period. To elaborate further on this point it is instructive
to decompose the expenditure on SDMs by individuals into two separate components- expenditure
that is driven by the incidence of an episode, and expenditure that is driven by the duration
of an episode. In addition to providing more detail on the structure of spending, this exercise
also addresses the concern that the large number of SDM reports we find is a product of our
methodology- under this hypothesis, 'real' expenditure is driven by a few, severe episodes, with the
bulk of SDM reports resulting in very little spending.
We thus estimate the following model:
Y= + /Xi + yEpi + dduri + -i
ei iid -N(O, ai)
where yi is the per capita log of expenditure on SDMI4 , Xi is a matrix of demographic variables
including gender, age, income and education, Epi is the number of SDM episodes reported by each
individual during the sampling period, duri is the average duration of a SDM episode, and Ei is an
individual specific error term.We find that the coefficients on both the number of full SDM episodes
and average duration of the episode (-y and 6 above) are positive and significant (not reported),
suggesting that expenditure on SDMs is indeed driven by both the duration of the illness and the
4 A formal test establishes the normality of the distribution of log expenditure
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absolute number of reported episodes. 15
The evidence presented so far shows that SDMs are integral to the health status of the in-
dividuals in our sample: they contribute significantly to the morbidity burden and account for a
large proportion of doctor visits and expenditure. Moreover, SDMs impact differentially on income
groups, with the poor spending significantly higher shares of income and their overall health budget
than the rich. These results are especially surprising if we think of SDM's as illnesses that are fairly
frequent and are associated with a list of common medicines that cani be used to alleviate symptoms
or provide relief. The different mix of actions across income groups- with the rich using chemists
to purchase their own medicine and the poor visiting doctors for their treatment- has important
consequences for expenditures and seems to poilnt towards systematic differences in the information
available to different incoiiie groups.
Before exploring this topic in greater detail below, it is instructive to fiurther decompose the
incidence of SDMs in our sample. Is it tile case that SDMs impact certain individuals/households
more than others? In the next section we concentrate on these questions through an examination
of the temporal dimensioii of illness making use of the longitudinal nature of our survey.
5 SDMs: Incidence Patterns
There are 1,621 individuals in our sample, out of whom 76 per cent ever report a SDM. Since a total
of 3,545 full SDM episodes are recorded, the number of episodes per capita is 2.20, and the number
of episodes per sick individual is 2.87. However, the experience of a large number of sick individuals
differs substantially from this average morbidity profile'. In particular, some individuals suffer a
large niumber of SDMs, while others only report a single episode. A useful typology to facilitate
this analysis is the division of individuials into three types:
* Type I : Individuals who report no SDM episodes
* Type II: Individuals who report one or two episodes
* Type III: Individuals who report more thani two episodes
The choice of two SDM episodes as the cut-off value between Type II and Type III is motivated
by two observations. First, more than 60 per cent of all individuals in the sample suffer two or
15 This finding is also iniportant because it provides an argminent for using self-reported morbidity as the variable
of interest when the actions we are trying to explain are related to the perception of the illness rather than to an
inderlying clinical conrlition even thouglh the 'self-report' may measure the 'true' clinical morhidity with error (see
Johansson, 1991 or Dow et al. 1997).
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fewer SDM episodes, and (ii) the average number of SDM episodes per individual is 2.19 Moreover
it is important to notice that under this classification, even a Type II ildividual could spend a
substantial portion of her time sick during the survey period. The distribution of subjects across
types is then as follows: 26 per cent are Type I, 38 per cent are Type II and 36 per cent are Type
III..
Within this particular classification, morbidity profiles are quite different across types. Type
II individuals experience 1.42 SDM episodes and spend 2.38 weeks sick on average, compared to
4.53 and 7.03 respectively for Type III individuals (Table 5). Further Type II individuals use
1.28 different diagnostic categories, and this increases to 3 diagnostic categories for the Type III
subjects. Thus, it appears that there are three broad categorizations of individuals: those who
report no illness at all., those who report one or two episodes that are different in nature, and those
who seem to be affected by a combination of different illnesses, some of which recur over time.
Given its important implications in terms of both health status and expenditure, the question
thern arises as to what explains the differences in the incid.ence of SDMs at the individual level.
To what extent is this polarizatioii a result of demographic and infrastructure characteristics as
opposed to randormt incidence patterns? The exercise below shows that while demographics are
important in understanding the origin of SDM incidence, other factors that may constitute the
'health-environment' and the 'health-market' play an equally significant role.
In order to check for (observable) differences across the three types, sample proportions by type
are presented in Table 6. Individuals of Type III suffer from chronic illnesses more than those of
Type I and II, and have a greater share of women and young children. As a result, a larger fraction
of individuals in this group are out of the labor force or in the informal sector. Finally, we also find
differences across the households where individuals from different groups live. In particular, Type
III individuials are overrepresented among the poor and in certain areas, and they tend to inhabit
households where in-house piped water and flush toilets are less common (Table 6.B).
To disentanigle the effect and relative irmportance of these different factors, we then model the
occurrence of a SDM episode as a Poisson distribution so that the probability that individual i
experiences a certain number y of SDM episodes is:
Pr(yJIs)=e- p for Vy = 0,1, 2...N
and
pi = E(yi4xi) = exp(xiB)
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where xi represents a set of individuial ils characteristics. For the purpose of the estimation we
construct four groups of individual characteristics (demographic characteristics, household income,
access to water and sanitation, and area of residence), and introduce them sequentially into the
model. Table 7 presents the results from the four models generated by this exercise.
The first model containing the demographic characteristics of the individual confirms to a large
extent the impressions we had derived from the sample proportions. Women and those who suffer
frorn a chronic condition appear to be mnore likely to experience a higli number of SDM episodes,
and so do married individuals, younig children and those who are out of the labor force. Education,
measured as having completed at least primary school, does not seem to have a strong effect on
morbidity however. These results are fairly robust to different model specifications, especially the
results concerning gender. marital status and age.
Model 2 incorporates income and Model 3 introduces inforiiiation about household sanitation
infrastructure and access to (clean) water. While income is negatively and significantly correlated
with the ntmber of reported SDM episodes in Model 2, this correlation disappears once we introduce
the facilities variables. To explore this point Table 8 presents data on sanitation infrastructuire and
access to water by income levels, making it clear that both the presence of a flilsh toilet and running
water in the houselhold are strongly correlated with income helnce makinlg these two sets of variables
highly multicollinear 6 .
Finally Model 4 includes area-of-residence indicators together with the demographic and income
variables. Because potentially we could aLso encounter a multicollinearity problem between area of
residence and income if neighborhoods in the survey were very homogenous. Table 8 also presents
the distribution of incomrie in all seven localities. We feel that there is substantial variation in
income both within and across areas to justify the conclusion of both income and area variables in
the regression, and although the effect of income disappears once we control for area of residence
it is important to notice that the locality-specific effects are not a direct reflection of the locality's
average income level (e.g. Noida. the second poorest community, enters the regression with a
significant negative coefficient, larger in magnlitude than those of other 'better-off' localities).
The full model then presents a world in which SDM clustering is mainly a function of the
individual's gender, age and marital status, as well as of her labor force status and area of residence.
While the interpretation of the demographic variables is fairly straight forward, the question arises
as to what exactly are the community indicators capturing. Based on our knowledge of these areas
The hypothesis that both infrastricttire indicators are not significantly differ ent from zero when a niodel inciliding
these indicators as well as income is estimated cannot he rejected at the 5 per cent confidence level.
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and on some preliminary evidence regarding health practitioners and their practices generated
by a practitioner survey that is currently being administered in these same localities, we would
like to argue here that to a large extent these indicators are capturing the effects of the 'health
environment', or.more precisely the 'health market', in which different individuals operate' 7 _ an
issue that we explore in more detail in the next section usiIng qualitative information (narratives
and case studies) collected during the survey period.
This concludes our documeiitation of the importance of SDMs, both in terms of the population's
morbidity profile and the expenditure they generate. Two key features emerge from our discussion:
(i) SDMs are extremely important in terms of prevalence, as well as doctor visits and expenditure
and, (ii) the incidence of SDMs is affected both by demographic characteristics of the sample as
well as 'environmental' factors captured by commtnity fixed effects.
6 Discussion
The picture of morbidity and health seeking behavior that we have constructed so far is very different
from what is normally encountered. For instance, approximately 40 per cent of our sample would
have reported 'yes' to the question "Did you have at least one SDM episode in the last month?"' 8
which is more than 300 per cent higher than that reported by the National Center for Applied
Economic Research (NCAER) for all India (400 versus 122). Siunilarly, expenditures on SDMs alone
are 250 per cent higher than that reported by the NCAER survey for all India, and more than 150%
higher than all medical expenditures reported by the Nation Sample Survey (NSS) in Delhi. Our
discussion focuses on two aspects of these findings. First, we exanine if the exceptional use of
health resources for SDMs is a facet of our sample rather than of the health environment in Delhi.
Second (if the picture of health behavior that we have constructed is in some sense 'representative'
of the population of Delhi) we discuss what the implications of these findings are for the economics
of health care in the urban context for a low-income country.
To an extent, doubts about the nature of our sample are mitigated by the close fit between
the observable characteristics of our sample with that of the NSS (Figure 3) in Delhi (particularly
the kernel densities of health expenditure based on the budget questionnaire) and this leads us to
think that the differences that have emerged are largely due to the two characteristics specific to
our dataset (the separation of chronic and acute reports, and the short recall period) that have not
been replicated thus far by other surveys.
17 By the term 'health environment' we imply both failures of the medical system represented by poor doctor
practices as well as patient behavior, such as inability to comply with medical regimes.
18 The qnestion reproduces the format of the NCAER survey, which uses a monthly recall questionnaire.
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Preliminary evidence that this is indeed the case19 follows from a simple counter-factual exercise
where we ask what morbidity profile would arise from our data if we imposed the restrictions
inherent in other available surveys20 . Although this exercise is fraught with difficulties since we
cannot identify the behavioral changes that result from a change in the recall period 2 l , we find
that the accounting of explicit restrictions in themselves yields significant insights.
For this purpose we consider two types of restrictions frequently imposed in those question-
naires: (i) the number of episodes that can be reported by each individual is restricted to one (all
questionnaires except NSS), and (ii) an illness is usually recorded only if it resulted in the loss
of work (NCAER, SLC). When these restrictions are applied to our dataset the number of SDM
reports decreases sharply22 . Only 75 per cent of the SDM episodes reported in our survey would
have been recorded had we restricted ourselves to one episode per individual per month, while
this number would have beeil around 10-15 per cent had we recorded exclusively those episodes
that caused the individual to lose at least one day of work. Finally the adoption of both criteria
simultaneously would have resulted in less than 8 per cent of the SDM episodes being recorded.
While this does provide some evidence that the nature of questions used in standard health
surveys severely underestimates the incidence of SDMs, our suspicion is that the length of the
recall period has an equally important role. Subsequent waves of data for the sarme sample that
were collected on a monthly recall basis will allow us to examine this issue with greater clarity in
the near future. If we then propose that the differences in our data arise not from the nature of
the sample, but from differences in the methodology, what are the implications of these findings
for our understanding of the health environment?
6.0.1 Implications for the Economics of Urban Health
Consider a standard model, as in Gertler and Van Gaag (1992), where ildividuals choose from a
number of options to maximize their utility. Following the Gertler-Van Gaag specification, let there
by n options. i = 1, 2,, ,,n, and let each option be indexed by two attributes, {pi, qi} where p and
q are respectively the price and quality of attribute i. Further, let an individuals utility be given
by Uj(Cj, H,w, I) where Cj = Yj- is the consumption net of expenditure on health care, H is
'9 This section is based on Jishnu Das & Carolina Sanchez "Self-Reported Morbidity Questionnaires: Reporting
Issues and Design Issues", 2002 mimeo.
20 For India we consider the following surveys: NCAER, SLC - Survey of Living Conditions (World Bank) and
LSMS - Living Standards Measurement Survey (World Bank).
21 This is particularly troublesome if most illnesses are 'minor' as seems to be the case in our sample.
22 Comparisons were done on a monthly basis so that numbers arising from our sample were comparable to those
from the standard surveys.
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the utility derived from good health, w is a state variable indicating the type of morbidity and I is
the information available to individual j.
If Uj (Cj, Hfw, I) is quasiconcave in its two arguments (conditional on the illness and informa-
tion) and individuals choose i to max Uj(.), the following two claims follow immediately:
Claim 1 For the same illness and the same information set, richer indrividuals will choose higher
quality (and more erpensive) treatment options
Claim 2 The quality-income gradient will increase wbith a decrease in the severity of the illness,
H.
The intuition for both claims follows from the quasiconcavity of U(.)- richer individuals will
care more about the health costs of an illness than the poor, and will thus choose better quality
options. Moreover, this difference must be greater for less severe illnesses since the loss from ill
health is smaller, and hence, the marginal loss of utility from higher priced treatment options is
accentuated at lower level of incomes. In other words, it is likely that a rich and a poor individual
who suffer from a fracture visit high quality treatment options, but unlikely that a poor individual
chooses a very high quality treatment option for a self-limiting cold relative to the rich.
The behavior across income groups in our sample however, is exactly the opposite of what would
be predicted by this theory with poor individuals spending inordinately high amounts on 'minor'
morbidities compared to the rich. Given the general formulatioii above, and noting that the claims
hold once we condition on w and I, there could be two different broad hypothesis for this behavior.
The first hypothesis is that even within SDMs, the epidemiological profiles that we observe are
very different for the rich and the poor- the results we obtain do not condition on the illness, w.
The inherent problem of not observing the underlying sickness (often referred to as the problem
of 'differing reporting thresholds') is shown in the figure below: Due to the nature of the disease
profiles and the reporting thresholds, the rich are observed to self-medicate more and visit doctors
less than the poor, but once we condition on the illness, the gradient between incomne and quality
is restored.
To an extent the problem of differing thresholds cannot be addressed due to the intrinsic nature
of the problem: while it may be possible to say that one individual has a compound fracture
(more severe) and another has a simple fracture (less severe), it is more difficult to claim that
one person's headache is more or less severe than others. Given that over 50 per cent of the
symptoms and diagnosis in our profile represent exactly those cases where the severity must be
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Figure 1: Reporting Thresholds and Income
self reported (pain, anxiety and weakness are three major categories), the problem of different
reporting thresholds must remain, to some degree, unresolved.
However, we note that the relationships that we observe regarding quality and income remain
robust to observable differences in morbidities: lower income groups choose higher quality choices
(doctors vs. self-medication) even if we conditioii on the type of illness, the duration of the illness,
and the interaction between the type and duration of the illness. Thus, we can say with some
confidence that poorer individuals who suffer from a headache for a week or less visit the doctor
more than rich people suffering from a headache for a week or less, but this still leaves open the
question of whether the poor persons headache is more or less painful than that of the rich.
A second hypothesis is that there are systeimatic differences in the information available to
individuals in different income groups. Qualitative evidence collected during the survey indicate
that there are two broad type of differences in information among individuals in our survey. First,
individuals in hligher income groups may be more informed about the type of illness they have
(diagnosis), and second, they may have more information about the mapping between illness and
medication (treatment).
A possible reformulation of the problem of diagnosis is to think of this as a problem of labeling
whereby observed differences in the treatment and reporting across income groups are inherently
linked to the construction of the category of short duration as opposed to chronic inorbidities. As
an example, consider the case of an individual with diabetes. The report of this illness may take
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one of two forms: either, the person may be aware of her diabetic condition, and when asked about
her health incorporates this illness into her health report. Alternatively, if the person is not aware
that she is diabetic, she may report the illness o7ny when symptoms occur- as a result, she may
report 'boils' or 'loss of sensation' as two tunconnected illness episodes, each lasting a short while as
two different episodes. In this case, while the first report would be coded as 'chronic', the second
would be coded as a 'short duration morbidity'. Thus, what we construe to be a short duration
morbidity in high incorne groups may be 'truly' such illnesses, but are a comibiniation of chronic and
other morbidities in lower income groups. This problem is potentially important since only 10% of
the poor, but 40% of the rich, report chronic conditions in our sample.23
One way to probe this hypothesis further is to consider a group that we would ex-ante expect
to be less prone to chronic illnesses than the entire population so that conditioning reporting
anld behavior oni this particular group would allow us to examine differentials across income groups
independent of the assumptions required in the construction of SDMs. One natural way to construct
this group is to rely on the sharp differentials in the incidence of chroinic illnesses by age24 anid
the results of conditioning reporting and health-seeking on the sample restricted to individuals less
than 30 years are presented in Tables 2a, 3b and 4c..
First, as expected, (Table 2a) there is a sharp increase (between 5 anid 7 times) in reported
chronic illnesses with age, although the lower reporting of chronic illnesses among the poor remains
in the restricted sample. Second, Table 3b shows that the pattern of doctor visits in the full
sample remains unchanged when we examine only individuals under 30. The probability of visiting
a practitioner is higher among the poor (11% of all weeks) compared to the rich (6.7%o of all
weeks) and further, higher visit proportions among the poor are retained wheni we conditioni onl the
occurrence of an SDM report (39% for the poor compared to 33% for the rich) or an SDM episode
(47% for the poor compared to 37% for the rich). As witlh the entire sample, the high rates of doctor
visits among the poor directly translates into higher proportional expenditure as well. Table 4c
shows absolute and proportional expenditure on SDMs and other morbidities disaggregated by age
and inlcome groups. While the spending on SDMs as a proportion of total health spending is nlow
23 For example, J., with tundiagnosed tuberciulosis, reports episodes like 'fever', 'headache' and 'body-ache' for 12
weeks of the survey, visits the same practitioner 5 times, hut is not asked to undertake a single diagnostic test. Every
week that she reports a new illness she makes no connection to her previous episode, which she regards as 'cured'.
Further, each week she takes a number of medicines, ranging fiom antibiotics to steroids and pain-killers, and over
the 16 weeks, she spends Rs.400, representing 2.5 per cent of the houisehold income. After the visit by the project
doctor and a subsequent chest X-ray, which she paid for on her own, a lesion detected in her right Ilng was diagnosed
as tuberculosis. She was then advised to visit the government TB clinic, where fiee treatment and medication are
provided under the DOTS program.
21 For instance, mortality due to chronic illnesses such as cancers and diabetes in the US increase by almost 50
times between the ages of 35 and 80 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002).
17
roughly equal across income groups (83% for poor and middle, 76% for the rich), as a proportion
of total spending the poor continue to spend 4 times as much as the rich on such mrorbidities.
Although not conclusive, these results suggest the observed patterns of doctor visits and health
expenditure on short duration imorbidities is not entirely driven by the misclassification of chronic
illnesses. To the extent that this misclassification exists (one such case is detailed in the footnote
below), it is critical to recognize that the nature of this problem is qualitatively different from the
normal construction of the problemn (see for instance, Belclier, 1976). Iladitionally it is assumed
that the inability of individual to diagnose a chronic illness is related to the lack of medical resources.
Our study shows that despite very high access and use of medical resources, the reporting of chronic
illnesses is high in rich income groups but remains low among the poor- for the poor, both individuals
and the medical system continue to treat most illness episodes as short duration morbidities.
The third assumlptioin in the model above that may fail is the assumption of equal-information
across income groups regarding the mapping between illness and treatment. In particular, if it is the
case that low income households have systematically less information about the treatment regimen
for a given illness on would expect patterns similar to that observed in the data to arise naturally.
Data from the sample on the prescription practices across low and high income households generates
some support for this hypothesis. In particular, the use of written docurnents a doctor increases
with the income of the individual, with 32 per cent of doctor visits among the poor resulting in a
prescription compared to 44 per cent for the rich. Siinilarly, the numiiber of cases where a person
is dispensed medication that is not identifiable decreases sharply from 474 to 151 moving from the
poor to the rich.25 Both of these statistics poinit towards a simple informational based explanation
for the pattern of doctor visits and expenditures that we observe in the sample, with greater self-
medication among the rich arising from more information regarding both their illniess and the types
of medications appropriate for their illiiess compared to the poor. The figure below summarizes
this discussion of the potential failures of the standard model in our data.
Our presentation so far has proposed a more nuanced view of the connection between health
and poverty. The impressive body of work that examinies differences in health expenditure patterns
across income groups at best provides information on how much individuials are spending (Berman,
1998). We have argued that additional informrlatioll on what individuals are spendinlg oin can provide
a very different picture. We have hypothesized that the differences in our data from what is normally
26 Why is a medicine not 'identifiable'? It is a common practice among practitioners in our sample to provide
a 'cocktail' of medicines to their patients. This cocktail is prepared by taking multiple tablets and crushing them
together before dispensing the mixture to the patient. As a result, almost no information is available, either to the
patient or to the researcher, about the type of medication dispensed in these cases.
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Figure 2: The Standard Model and the Delhi Data: Potential Reconciliations
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observed is not a facet of the sample, but of the study methodology and in doing so hypothesize
on the centrality of information in the health seeking behavior of individuals.
7 Conclusion
The health problems of Low Income Countries have been closely tied to the ability of individuals to
access and pay for quality medical services. The implied corollary is that improvements in access
and ability to pay will translate directly into improvements in health. While such improvements
are clearly a necessary condition, the picture that we have presented suggests that there are other
complex barriers to improved health which deserve closer attention. We have argued that one way
to better understand the nature of these barriers and the relationship between poverty and health
is to focus our attention on a class of morbidities we have called 'Short Duration Morbidities'.
These morbidities are highly prevalent, induce a large number of doctor visits (1 out of every 3
weeks with an SDM results in a doctor visit) and every week of sickness with suchi a morbidity is
associated with a 25 per cent increase in health expenditure. SDMs tend to cluster by individuals,
with those reporting 'multiple-episodes' accounting for more than 70 per cent of the sick-time and
expenditure on such morbidities. While part of these multiple episodes are a reflection of observable
demographic characteristics, the specific neighborhood that the individual resides in also plays an
important role, independent of the availability of sanitary and iilfrastructure facilities.
Finally, significant differences arise between income groups in the treatment of such morbidities.
The poor people in our sample report a large number of SDMs, and nearly one out of every
two such reports is tied to a doctor visit. Since imiost of these visits are to the private sector,
the poor also end up spending a large proportion of their income on SDMs. In some cases, the
reports of such inorbidities arise from an underlying condition that remains undiagnosed, and
preliminary research with medical practitioners shows that the medication that they receive is
often inappropriate or contra-indicated. At best, this prolongs the length of time spent sick; at
worse, this in itself generates further sickness and ill health. This evidence challenges the view
that frequent doctor visits are beneficial since they may actually result in early diagnosis of severe
conditions (Saradarnrna et al. 2000).
The rich also report a large number of SDMs. However, instead of going to the doctor, they
overwhelmingly tend to self-medicate for such conditions. Although they spend more money than
the poor, the amount spent, both as a proportion of income and as a proportion of total health
expenditure is much smaller. As opposed to the poor, who report no expenditure-generating chronic
illnesses, more than 40 per cent of all individuals report such morbidities in the higher income
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groups, and such illnesses account for the bulk of their medical expenditure. The prevalence,
nature of spending, and variation across income groups raise several questions regarding economic
and health outcomes in such environments.
One out of every ten individuals in our sample spends two months out of four sick with SDMs.
As a percentage of the potential labor force, this number increases to ahnost one out of every
five. What then. are the consequences of such morbidities for the labor supply decisions of the
household? Potentially, it could be argued that such miorbidities do not result in loss of labor days
since they do little to impair the normal finctioning of the individual.
However, as Morduch (1995) has argued, the 'loss of work' may not be the correct variable to
look at, if households bulild their health profiles into their choice of production techniques. For
instance, households which are more likely to have poor health may choose an inherently less
productive but iimore flexible production process, however the effect of such a choice will lnot show
up in analysis that takes the choice of production as exogenous to health. In a sample such as
ours, where the overwhelming majority (65 per cent) of the employed work in the informal sector,
this argument is especially relevant 26 . Further, since the choice between employment in the formal
and the infonnal sector (which is more flexible) may itself be a function of health, restrictions to
wage-earners (Schultz and Tansel, 1997) would bias the estimated coefficients. One way to tackle
this issue that we will explore in futture work is to study the direct impact of illness on productivity
and income, rather than concentrate oIn the work-days lost due to sickness.
Our findings also raise questioins regarding the constraints to health improvements in such en-
vironments. On the one hand, households spend significant proportions on SDMs, while on the
other, health outcomes, especially among the lower income groups are extremely poor. Individuals
primarily visit the same doctors, always in their neighborhood, who prescribe and dispense mned-
ication that is often unsuited to their underlying medical condition. and that may even contribute
to the developiment of other drug-resistant infectioiis (research currently being undertaken).
It could be argued that this pattern of frequent visits to poor-quality private practitioners and
the associated consumption of inadequate medication are specific to urban settings. For instance, it
is possible for dense urban areas to have a much thicker network of 'bad' private doctors who over-
prescribe than rural areas where use of public resources or more traditional health care approaches
may be made. However, evidence from rural survey data shows that this is not the case. Using data
collected by the World Bank from 125 randomly selected villages in rural India, Das (2000) shows
26 For example, when asked albout the number of work days missed due to illness, we often heard answers like "How
can I not work? I went to sell vegetables, but then I was feeling tired all day and could not do much"
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that the probability of visiting an untrained practitioner is 70 per cent for low income households,
and remains high (at 42 per cent) for those in the 90th income percentile27 . Moreover, as in urban
areas, such visits to low-quality private doctors translate into extensive misuse of medication,
including antibiotics. For example, Dineshkumar et al. argue that " [...] broad spectrum antibiotics
constitute a high proportion of prescription in rural areas" (Dineshkumar et al., 1995; also see
Kuruvilla et al., 1994).
The crucial question that arises theil is why individuals return time and again to doctors who
provide standards of care below the acceptable norm. Is it the case that other doctors in the city are
too expensive, while the time costs of goilng to government hospitals (which are free) are too high?
Or, do such patterns reflect behavioral constraints, such as a reluctance by women to leave their
neighborhoods? An alternative hypothesis, discussed in Das is that these patterns of use reflect
inefficiencies in the process through which households learn about doctor quality (J. Das, 2000).
Sick individuals initially go to neighborhood doctors due to the low cost of such visits. Doctors
heavily medicate such individuals, often in forms that are not recognizable. A 'cure' in such cases is
then attributed to the (high) quality of the doctor rather than the self-limited nature of the illness
and for future illnesses, the same pattern repeats itself.
The answer to these questions have important implications for policy: if it is the case that
information plays a significant role in the nature of health spending and the choice of doctors, then
demand side interventions, aimed at providing more informiiationi to households and making them
better 'consumers' may be more beneficial than supply side interventions that aim to increase the
accessibility of households to medical providers. In fact it may even be the case that supply side
interventions, in an environment where informiiation is scarce, actually worsens inefficiencies in the
health environment.
Clearly the role of information and the structure of the health market in urban regions where
access constraints are not of primary importance needs to be examined in greater detail. Never-
theless, we feel that the results generated so far provide key insights into the relationship between
health seeking behavior and health resources in Low Income Countries. The findings presented lead
us to reconstruct some of the dominant notions regarding the health environment in such contexts
and opens up an agenda for future work.
27 Note that these visits are not visits to traditioinal doctors, who are accounted for by separate categories in the
survey.
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Appendix I - Comparison with the Delhi Sample from the National Family and
Health Survey (1993)
The data used in this paper (ISERDD henceforth) is compared here to the Delhi sample from
the National FAmily and Health Survey collected in 1993 (NFHS henceforth) to evaluate the ex-
tent to which it is representative of the Delhi population. The analysis concentrates on different
demographic characteristics of individuals in the sample, such as age, marital status, and education
attaintmernt, as well as on household characteristics. Unfortunately the NFHS does not contain
income or expenditure information.
Age. Table A.1 presents the age distribution in the ISERDD and NFHS samples (numbers for
the latter appear in parentheses), disaggregated by gender. Both distributions are fairly similar.
Marital Status. Table A.2 presents data for individuals in four different categories (never
married, currently married, widowed and divorced/separated) by age groups and gender for the
ISERDD and NFHS samples (numbers for the latter appear in parentheses). Again figures for both
data sets are similar, although the fraction of individuals who are currently married (never married)
is slightly higher (lower) in the NFHS sample than in the ISERDD sample.
Education attaintment. Table A.3 presents the distribution of both samples across different
education levels by age group and gender. In general education attainment is somewhat higher in
the ISERDD sample than in the NFHS sample for most age groups and independent of gender.
This is due to both samples being roughly one generation appart. combined with the fact that
younger generations ar more educated than older generations.
Household composition and size. Table A.4 presents information on the demographic char-
acteristics of the household head and Table A.5 presents the distribution of households according to
size. Given that there are no significant differences in neither the age distribution nor the marital
status distribution between the NFHS and the ISERDD samples, differences in the characteristics
of the household head are interpreted as resulting from differences in the definition of household
head rather than from true underlying sample differences. In particular, most household heads
in the NFHS sample are middle-aged, married males (househol head as bread winner), while this
group seems to share household-head responsabilities with older, widowed women (household head
as eldest person in household) in the ISERDD sample.
Average household size is similar in both samples, although the NFHS contains a larger fraction
of small and large households (1, 2, 3 and 8(+) -people households) than the ISERDD sample.
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Household facilities. Table A.6 contains information on light and drinking water sources,
and type of latrine for both samples. The main differences arise regarding the type of latrine, with
a much larger fraction of the NFHS using flush toilet or no toilet - as opposed to services latrines
or septic tanks.
Expenditure: Figure A.1 presents the kernel densities of expenditure under various categories
for the ISERDD and the NSS (2000) sample for Delhi. Although efforts were made to remain
as close as possible to the NSS Schedule 10, there were some changes made to better reflect the
spending patterns of our sample. For both studies however, the food questionnaire is identical.
The kernel densities show that the ISERDD sample has a greater proportion of households in the
upper income groups, and this is accounted for by a decrease in the proportion of households in the
middle income groups. Note however, that in all cases, expenditures match up closely for the lower
incorme groups. For the entire samnple, tests of equality of distributions holds for food expenditure,
but not for others.
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Table L.A Sample Proportions - Individuals
Morbidity Reported ever sick 82.74 77.40 78.79 80.49
Reported ever SDM 81.86 74.57 71.72 76.37
(Diagnosed) Chronic Condition 9.33 15.63 31.81 18.14
Gender Female 45.07 48.77 50.72 48.05
Age Distribution 0-4 10.85 6.74 5.29 8.05
5-14 32.90 22.16 15.64 24.03
15-29 25.18 32.95 27.27 28.34
30-49 25.00 26.40 31.92 27.52
50-64 3.31 8.09 13.95 8.12
> 65 2.76 3.66 5.92 3.93
Education Illiterate 51.41 20.34 4.16 27.14
< Primary 7.04 6.59 2.91 5.49
Primary 10.21 13.18 2.49 8.95
Middle 17.25 18.46 6.86 14.44
High School 13.73 29.94 25.57 22.64
> High School 0.35 11.49 58.00 21.34
Marital Status Now Married 38.73 41.05 50.73 43.16
Never Married 58.27 55.18 42.62 52.47
Widowed 2.99 3.58 6.44 4.24
Migrant Status First Generation Migrant 34.86 34.46 30.56 33.42
Labor Force Status Public Sector 4.66 8.80 8.38 7.46
(> 16 years old) Private Sector 16.85 10.26 9.22 11.76
Informal Sector 29.75 25.22 28.21 27.61
Unemployed 3.94 3.52 1.68 2.97
Retired 1.08 2.64 4.19 2.76
Out of Labor Force 43.73 49.56 48.32 47.44
Number of 568 531 481 1,621
individuals C
A All numbers in percentages
r3 Individuals of schooling age (0 to 15) were assigned the education level of an adult in the household selected
according to the following rules: (i) female head or spouse of head under 45, (ii) female daughter or daughter-in-law of
head under 45, (iii) female head or spouse of head over 45. and (iv) female daughter or daughter-in-law of head over
45.
' Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals)
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table l.B Sample Proportions - Households
Flush System 0.00 75.26 92.78 56.01
Septic Tank 25.77 9.28 1.03 12.03
Service Latrine 52.58 12.37 1.03 21.99
Open Air 4.12 0.00 0.00 1.37
Other Latrine 11.34 2.06 0.00 4.47
Cooking Fuel LPG 45.36 183.33 94.85 74.48
Local Gas 0.00 2.08 5.15 2.41
Electricity 2.06 2.08 0.00 1.38
Kerosene 351.96 7.29 0.00 13.10
Coal 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.34
Firewood 19.59 5.21 0.00 8.28
LightLSource NocLight 4.12 1.03 3.09 2.75
________________ ________________(ch eck ) _ _ _ _ _ _
Electricity 88.66 98.97 95.88 94.50
Gas/Oil 1.03 0.00 1.03 0.69
Other 6.19 0.00 0.00 2.06
Drinking Water Tap 77.32 96.91 100.00 91.41
Source Tube well/Hand pump 0.00 1.03 0.00 0.34
Tank/Pond 22.68 2.06 0.00 8.25
Number of 97 97 97 300
households B
All numbers in percentages
B Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals)
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 2a. SDM Profile: Nature and Duration of Episodes
Gastrointestinal 460 4.50
Respiratory (except TB) 1249 6.75
Cardiac 1211.67
Derrnatological 292 14.42
ENT 253 9.76
Urinary 22 11.86
Gynecological 53 10.58
Neurological 110 2.85
Muscular 498 8.87
Fever 296 4.86
Other non-chronic 8 16.00
No diagnosis available 71 11.51
All 3324 7.59
A 'Gastrointestinal' includes acidity, diarrhea, dysentery, and worms. 'Respiratory' cold and cough, respiratory allergy,
tonsillitis, and influenza. 'Cardiac' high\low blood pressure. 'Dermatological' boils, scabies, bums, and dermatological
allergy. 'ENT' includes ear or eye infection, nose bleeding and ear wax. Urinary' includes urinary infection, and
cystitis. 'Gynecological' includes menstrual problems, cramps, and STDs. 'Neurological includes headache. 'Musculo-
skeletal' includes sprain/strain, muscle pull, and rminor injuries. 'Fever' includes viral fever and non-specific fevers.
'Other non-chronic' includes dehydration, chicken pox, weakness, tension/anxiety.
B Duration (measured in days) is missing for 6 per cent of the SDM episodes (221 episodes), evenly distributed across
categories. Out of these 221 episodes 90 per cent were reported for a maximum of I or 2 weeks.
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 2a. Chronic Illnesses: % reporting a chronic condition by age group and Income
Under 30 3.7 4.5 10.1 5.52
Over 30 22.86 35.08 53.39 38.30
Total 9.33 15.63 31.81
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 3a. Distribution of Practitioner Visits for SDMs, by Income Group. Chemist
Excluded.
_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~. . .-';* 
All 8.75 34.46 42.05 0.55
Poor 11.62 39.66 47.10 0.62
Middle 7.90 32.08 40.02 0.54
Rich 6.50 29.87 36.30 0.45
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 3b. Distribution of Practitioner Visits for SDMs, by Income Group: Sample
Restricted to Individuals under 30 years. Chemist Excluded.
All - 8.82 36.47 - 44 0.56
Poor 11.04 39.02 47 0.60
Middle 7.60 34.69 44 0.57
Rich 6.68 33.29 37 0.45
Table 4.A Average Monthly Health Expenditure by Nature of Episode and Income Group -
Individuals
5DM episodes 25.5 24.5 26.0 27.1
Chronic episodes 22.5 4.5 32.2 34.2
Total health expenditure 55.1 34.2 69.1 67.0
Note: Amnounts reflected in the SDM and chronic columns do not add up to total health expenditure because some
episodes, such as tuberculosis, as neither SDMs or chronic episodes.
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 4.B Average Monthly Health Expenditure by Nature of Episode and Income Group -
Households
SDM episodes 138.1 143.5 142.5 134.0
Chronic episodes 121.3 26.2 177.7 170.0
Total health expenditure 297.7 200.2 378.5 333.1
Total expenditure 8017.9 4310.7 5763.0 14029.6
Note: Amounts reflected in the SDM and chronic columns do not add up to total health expenditure because some
episodes, such as tuberculosis, as neither SDMs or chronic episodes.
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 4.C Average Monthly Health Expenditure by Nature of Episode and Income Group -
Sample Restricted to Individuals under 30 (% of household spending in brackets)
SDM episodes 21.5 (2.7) 27 (2.1) 28 (0.6)
Chronic episodes 0.9 (0. 1) 3.9 (0.3) 4.5 (0.1)
Total health expenditure 26 32.5 36.5
Note: Amounts reflected in the SDM and chronic columns do not add up to total health expenditure because some
episodes, such as tuberculosis, as neither SDMs or chronic episodes.
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 5. Morbidity Profiles for Individuals of Types 1, 11, and III
Average number of full SDM episodes 1.42 4.53
Average number of sick-weeks 2.38 7.05
,Number of individuals in group 625 586
1 350 0
2 275 0
3 0 213
4 0 128
5 0 105
6 0 62
7 0 42
8 0 22
9 0 6
10 0 6
11 0 1
1 2 0 1
Number of individuals in group 625 586
I Episode 2 Episode
1 245 0 0
2 59 159 0
3 18 71 76
4 5 23 82
5 1 4 80
6 3 7 79
7 1 3 47
8 0 1 47
9 1 0 46
10 3 3 37
2 1 0 0 29
12 ~~~~~~~2 0 16
13 2 2 8
14 °-0 2 .13
15 1 0 10
16 4 0 16
Number of individuals in group 350 275 586
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 6.A Sample Proportions by Type - Individual Characteristics
Morbidity (Diagnosed) Chronic Condition | 14.14 T 17.60 | 21.50
Gender Fernale 38.05 44.16 59.21
Age Distribution 0-4 2.68 7.52 11.77
5-14 23.17 26.88 19.79
15-29 34.87 28.32 21.67
30-49 26.58 24.00 29.86
50-64 8.53 6.72 8.70
> 65 3.17 5.28 2.73
Education B Illiterate 22.19 30.40 27.13
< Primary 5.12 4.32 6.99
Primary 8.78 8.16 9.89
Middle 13.90 14.24 15.01
High School 22.68 23.84 21.33
> High School 27.31 19.04 19.62
Marital Status Now Married 41.22 40.00 47.61
Never Married 54.39 56.16 47.61
Widowed 4.39 3.84 4.78
Migrant Status First Generation Migrant 35.12 32.80 32.76
Labor Force Status Public Sector 11.93 7.77 3.31
(> 16 years old) Private Sector 12.28 14.51 7.73
Informal Sector 26.67 25.13 29.01
Unemployed 4.56 2.85 1.38
Retired 3.16 2.85 2.21
Out of Labor Force 41.40 46.89 56.35
N 410 625 586
Type 1: Reports no SDM episodes, Type 11: Reports at most tow SDM episodes, Type 111: Reports three or more SDM
episodes.
A All numbers in percentages
B Individuals of schooling age (O to 15) were assigned the education level of an adult in the household selected
according to the following rules: (i) female head or spouse of head under 45, (ii) female daughter or daughter-in-law of
head under 45, (iii) female head or spouse of head over 45, and (iv) female daughter or daughter-in-law of head over
45.
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 6.B Sample Proportions by Type - Household Characteristics and Area of Residence
income HPoor 28.93 36.02 40.81
. Middle 36.16 34.70 30.65
Rich 34.91 29.28 28.55
Water and Main water source - private tap 67.97 61.12 58;02
sanitation Toilet - private flush 51.83 44.16 39.41
Area of residence B. Kheda 9.51 15.20 23.21
J. Puri 12.93 14.56 18.77
Noida 15.37 18.08 14.33
S. Vihar 6.59 11.20 17.58
K. Nagar 12.93 11.84 7.00
P. Nagar 16.83 18.72 16.72
S. Delhi 25.85 10.40 2.39
N Number of individuals 410 625 586
Type I Reports no SDM episodes, Type II: Reports at most tow SDM episodes, Type III: Reports three or more SDM
episodes.
A All numbers in percentages
B Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals)
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 7. Determinants of the Number of SDM Episodes at the Individual Level - Poisson
Model (Sample Means need to be added)
Chronic condition 0. 140 " 0. 162 0.167 0.063
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Fernale 60.320 0.332 0.329 * 0.344
(0.041" (0.0422 (0.042) (0.042)
Married 0.421 -- 0.402 0.400 0.352"
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Age [5, 15) -0.445 -0.428 -0.429 -0.463
(0.0632 (0.064) (0.064 (0.06
Age [15, 50) -0.569 -0.532 -0.531 -0.526
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
Age [50, +) -0.573 -0.505 -0.511 -0.548 -
(0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089)
Primary or higher -0.064 -0.001 0.005 -0.083
(0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047)
Out of LF 0.129" 0.129 0.134 0.093
(0.050) (0.050 (0.050) (0.051)
Middle income -0.132 -0.032 -0.061
(0.043) (0.051) (0.049)
High income -0.194 -0.012 -0.114
(0.049) (0.071) (0.077)
Private tap -0.062
(0.046?
Private flush -0.154
(0.055)
J. Puri -0.119
(0.063)
Noida -0.453
(0.068)
S. Vihar 0.150
(0.091)
K. Nagar -0.530
(0.086?
P. Nagar -0.373
(0.057)
S. Delhi -1.305
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (0 .1 0 9 )
N A 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580
Chi 2 278.23 283.68 295.69 643.99
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Significantly different from zero at the 10% level
Robust standard errors in parentheses
A Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals), and data on water and sanitation is missing for
I household (I individual).
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Table 8. Sample Variation - Infrastructure, Income Categories and Area of Residence
Water and Sanitation by Income Level (% of Households)
Poor 26.80 0.00
Middle 71.13 49.48
Rich 94.84 91.72
Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals), and data on water and sanitation is missing for I
household (I individual).
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Distribution of Income by Area (% of Households)
Poor 73.33 14.58 65.12 0.00 0.00 56.52 7.69
Middle 24.44 72.92 25.58 0.00 45.95 32.61 20.51
Rich 2.22 12.50 0.00 100.00 48.65 6.52 69.23
N 45 48 43 42 37 46 39
Income information is not available for 9 households (41 individuals).
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
Water and Sanitation by Area (% of Households)
B. Kheda 37.77 0.00
J. Puri 77.08 64.58
Noida 23.25 20.93
S. Vihar 95.23 90.47
K. Nagar 80.55 63.88
P. Nagar 52.17 13.04
S. Delhi 89.74 87.17
Data on water and sanitation is missing for I household (I individual).
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - designed and collected by a team of which the authors are members
(Delhi, India)
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Appendix I - Tables
Table A.1 Age Distribution
Age Group Males Females
0-4 10.93 10.14
(11.4) (12.6)
5-14 23.63 23.11
(22.3) (24.0)
15-29 25.89 29.40
(31.6) (30.7)
30-49 27.55 25.93
(24.7) (23.0)
50-64 8.31 7.45
(7.0) (6.6)
>65 3.68 3.98
(2.9) (3.1)
Median Age 22 22
All numbers in percentages. National Family and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Table A.2 Marital Status Distribution
Age Never Married Currently Widowed Divorced/
Married Sepa rated
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
All groups 55.70 49.29 41.69 44.54 2.38 6.03 0.24 0.13
(46.4) (39.3) (51.5) (53.7) (1.8) (6.4) (0.3) (0.4)
0-14 98.97 100.00 0.34 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
(99.0) (99.5) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.00)
15-19 100.00 95.29 0.00 4.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(96.4) (81.2) (3.50) (18.5) (0.00) (0.00) (0.1) (0.4)
20-24 83.78 54.79 14.86 43.84 1.35 1.37 0.00 0.00
(64.5) (29.7) (34.7) (69.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6)
25-29 34.00 5.63 66.00 94.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
.________ (23.9) (6.7) (75.5) (92.5) (0.4) 0.3) _ (0.3) (0.4)
30-34 4.35 0.00 95.65 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
__________ (5.6) (1.5) (93.1) (94.8) (0.8) (4 (0.5) (.3)
35-39 3.57 0.00 92.86 96.83 1.79 3.17 1.79 0.00
(2.3) (0.8) (95.9) (94.1) (1.4) (4-1) ((0.3) (1.0)
40-44 1.61 0.00 98.39 97.73 0.00 2.27 0.00 0.00
(I.1) (0.8) (95.8) (91.4) (2.7) (7.0) (0.4) (0.8)
45-49 0.00 0.00 100.00 86.49 0.00 13.51 0.00 0.00
(1.9) (0.5) (95.6) (83.8) (2.4) (15.1) (0.00) (0.5)
50-54 3.45 0.00 93.10 89.47 3.45 10.53 0.00 0.00
(2.4) (1.1) (94.1) (77.7) (2.8) (21.2) (0.6) (0.00)
55-59 0.00 0.00 94.74 76.19 0.00 19.05 5.26 4.16
(1.3) (0.5) (93.8) (73.1) (4.6) (25.1) (0.4) (1.4)
>60 1.89 0.00 69.81 34.69 28.30 65.31 0.00 0.00
(0.8) (1.4) (81.4) (43.8) (17.2) (54.4) (0.2) (0.2)
All numbers in percentages. National Family and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Table A.3 Education Attainment Distribution
Illiterate Less than Primary Middle High School More than
Prl _ary High School
Age M F M F M F M F M F M F
Group
All groups 10.11 23.58 10.25 8.73 13.34 13.94 23.46 17.76 23.31 17.92 19.52 18.07
(14.3) (29.2) (16.0) (15.8) (15.9) (15.1) (14.4) (11.2) (23.3) (16.0) (15.7) (12.5)
6-9 13.56 13.46 45.76 44.23 33.90 36.54 6.78 5.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(19.4) (20.6) (77.1) (76.7) (2.0) (2.4) (0.00) (0.1) (0.00) (0.0) (0.00) (0.0)
10-14 4.90 7.50 18.63 15.00 34.3 32.50 41.18 43.75 0.98 1.25 0.00 0.00
(5.6) (8.9) (32.0) (29.6) (49.3) (47.5) (12.5) (13.7) (0.5) (0.3) (0.00) (0.00)
15-19 7.45 3.53 4.26 1.18 7.45 5.88 39.36 44.71 39.36 43.53 2.13 1.18
(11.3) (14.4) (4.6) (2.7) (17.2) (14.6) (34.4) (28.9) (29.2) (33.5) (3.2) (5.8)
20-24 4.05 17.81 2.70 2.74 5.41 5.48 27.03 8.22 43.24 31.51 17.57 34.25
(13.0) (27.0) (3.3) (2.7) (12.9) (9.4) (16.1) (12.3) (33.1) (24.6) (21.3) (24.0)
25-29 14.00 29.58 2.00 4.23 4.00 7.04 22.00 14.08 24.00 21.13 34.00 23.94
(12.8) (31.7) (4.2) (3.8) (9.6) (10.6) (16.3) (10.8) (33.6) (21.1) (23.4) (21.7)
30-34 15.94 25.86 2.90 3.45 10.14 13.79 15.94 8.62 27.54 15.52 27.54 32.76
(14.7) (33.5) (4.3) (4.0) (11.2) (11.4) (13.9) (8.4) (31.7) (20.1) (24.0) (22.5)
35-39 8.93 38.10 0.00 9.52 14.29 12.70 23.21 7.94 25.00 12.70 28.57 19.05
(16.3) (36.0) (4.1) (3.1) (12.9) (10.0) (12.3) (8.8) (29.4) (18.5) (24.9) (23.2)
40-44 9.68 25.00 9.68 2.27 4.84 4.55 20.97 6.82 22.58 15.91 32.26 45.45
(16.6) (39.7) (5.5) (5.1) (12.2) (11.3) (11.1) (6.2) (28.8) (19.3) (25.6) (18.5)
45-49 17.78 27.03 6.67 0.00 6.67 2.70 6.67 18.9 20.00 13.51 42.22 37.84
(14.6) (41.5) (5.1) (4.1) (10.7) (12.6) (12.1) (9.7)2 (27.7) (19.0) (29.6) (13.1)
50+ 11.88 49.44 8.91 6.74 5.94 14.61 12.87 4.49 27.72 13.48 32.67 11.24
(21.9) (57.8) (8.8) (5.9) (12.3) (11.9) (9.1) (7.1) (25.8) (10.0) (21.8) (6.7)
All numbers in percentages. National Famnily and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study -Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Table A.4 Household Head Characteristics
Gender A we Marital Status
Male Female <30 30-44 45-59 60+ Never Currently Divorced/ Widowed
Married Married Separated
85.86 14.14 4.04 41.75 30.64 23.57 0.00 83.50 0.67 15.82
(93.7) (6.3) (17.9) (43.9) (25.9) (12.3) (3.4) (88.4) (0.4) (7.8)
All numbers in percentages. National Family and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study- Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Table A.5 Household Size Distribution
Members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ Mean
RH size
Frequency 0.33 4.00 6.67 22.33 26.00 19.00 10.00 11.66 5.4
(6.1) (7.6) (11.2) (18.8) (18.6) (14.5) (9.3) (13.9) (5.1)
All numbers in percentages. National Family and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study- Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Table A.6 Household Facilities
Light So rce Drinking water source Type of Lat rine
Electricity Other Tap Tube well/ Water Flush Service Latr./ No Other
Hand pump Tank System Septic Tank Latrine
Frequency 94.65 5.35 90.64 0.33 9.03 55.85 22.41 5.35 4.35
(95.5) (4.50) (84.30) (15.20) (-) (72.50) (11.20) (15.90) (0.90)
All numbers in percentages. National Family and Health Survey in parentheses
Source: ISERDD Health Panel Data Study - Delhi and National Family and Health Survey (1993)
Figure A.l: Kernel Densities of Expenditure: NSS and 1SERDD sample
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